On Criminal Responsibility

Ever since Vincent Li was found not to be criminally responsible for the murder of Tim McLean, there has been a popular furor over the idea, and the question has been answered many times by many people, very few of whom are thinking clearly: is it fair not to hold someone criminally accountable for a crime such as murder? Though many object, I feel that the answer is a resounding “yes.”

Our legal system exists to fairly judge each case brought before it and take the proper course of action, with little regard for the pressures of public opinion. On the spectrum of thought, running from emotional to intellectual, it must be seated firmly in the latter end. Justice is not born in the minds of the opinionated, uninformed masses — lynchings are. Mob politics have no place in any society which claims to be civilized, as ours so frequently and thoughtlessly does. Questions in such a society must be decided by the firm hand of reason, not by the decrepit hand of an arthritic demagogue.

I have heard the objections many times over. I have been told that Li is being “let off” after committing murder — “you can’t just let him go like that,” they say. If I were to count the number of times I have heard such statements, I could easily spend the next month doing so. The problem with such statements is that they have no regard for reason, nor any respect for the complexity or context of the situation.

Li is not being allowed to go free, and he is not being given a lighter sentence due to his mental illness. Contrary to the demands of emotion, which we are all subject to, the law has chosen to take the path of reason. The question has been asked already: what is to be gained by imprisoning those whose crimes were committed due to a condition which made their actions incomprehensible to them? The answer is nothing — nothing can be gained from such a foolish action. It is impossible to deter someone from further acts through punishment, if he did not choose to commit those acts to begin with. Revenge is certainly a motive for some, but not for a reasonable justice system. Society gains nothing by causing suffering to those who have done so to others. The only motive that remains, then, is to remove the accused from society in the interest of everyone’s safety: a noble motive, but one which is only valid when the accused acted of his own volition.

In cases where the accused was not in a reasonable state of mind when he committed his crimes, how can such a punishment have any merit? If he is to spend twenty-five years in prison, will it deter him from further acts? Certainly not: he did not intend to perform the act in the first place. Will society be safer with him removed? It will, but the method is hardly desirable. Will the public’s desire for revenge be sated? Yes, it will.

This is where my talk of the nature of justice becomes important. Justice is not a vehicle of revenge. Justice is not an envenomed blade, nor is it a cup of poisoned wine. Justice is a means by which problems can be resolved; it does not entail the creation of sacrificial lambs to be devoured by the public in an orgy of self-righteous slaughter. It exists to serve a purpose and to be fair to all involved. If it fails in this regard, then it has failed as a system, and it has failed the people it serves.

To condemn a mentally-ill person to a life in prison is ludicrous when alternatives exist. In such cases, the accused should be placed in a facility in which he can be treated, and possibly rehabilitated. When a man commits a crime due to a mental problem, he should not himself be held accountable; instead, the mental issue which forced him to commit the crime should be held accountable, and every effort should be made to correct it. If this is possible, then he should be released. To imprison him at that point would serve no purpose above base, simple-minded revenge; this is not the type of society we live in.

In medieval times, insanity was thought to be caused by demonic possession. For this reason, the insane were often beaten in futile attempts to drive out the demons. Needless to say, this “treatment” was useless, and served nothing but to increase the victim’s torments. Today, we are faced with the same question; only now, the demons we are attempting to drive out are our own. Shall we beat and torture a confused and sick man in order to satisfy our lust for revenge? Or will we take the high road of reason and give him the help he needs, even if it means leaving bare our crucifix?

Ethan Meanor
March 2009